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Abstract
Classical and operant conditioning principles, such as the behavioral discrepancy-derived assumption that reinforcement always 
selects antecedent stimulus and response relations, have been studied at the neural level, mainly by observing the strengthening 
of neuronal responses or synaptic connections. A review of the literature on the neural basis of behavior provided extensive 
scientific data that indicate a synthesis between the two conditioning processes based mainly on stimulus control in learning tasks. 
The resulting analysis revealed the following aspects. Dopamine acts as a behavioral discrepancy signal in the midbrain pathway 
of positive reinforcement, leading toward the nucleus accumbens. Dopamine modulates both types of conditioning in the Aplysia 
mollusk and in mammals. In vivo and in vitro mollusk preparations show convergence of both types of conditioning in the same 
motor neuron. Frontal cortical neurons are involved in behavioral discrimination in reversal and extinction procedures, and 
these neurons preferentially deliver glutamate through conditioned stimulus or discriminative stimulus pathways. Discriminative 
neural responses can reliably precede operant movements and can also be common to stimuli that share complex symbolic 
relations. The present article discusses convergent and divergent points between conditioning paradigms at the neural level of 
analysis to advance our knowledge on reinforcement. Keywords: behavior analysis, classical conditioning, dopamine, neuronal 
plasticity, operant conditioning, reinforcement.
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Introduction
I. P. Pavlov’s work represents a historical landmark in 
the development of modern neuroscience. Using the tools 
available at the time, he focused on cerebral processes in 
his theoretical and experimental investigation of behavior. 
The process of classical conditioning was extensively 
demonstrated in his laboratory and remains one of the 
most fruitful models in modern neuroscience.
Pavlov and his group found that decerebrated 
animals do not exhibit conditioned reflexes, whereas 
unconditioned responses were preserved, including 
orientation reflexes toward a sound source, escape from 
movement restraint, and rejection of acid dropped in 
the mucous membrane of the mouth (Pavlov, 1927). 
To Pavlov, the conditioned reflex obviously recruited 
a higher level of cortical activity compared with the 
simple unconditioned reflex arc. At that higher level, 
a set of reflexes could occur, ranging from conditioned 
stimulus (CS) perception to conditioned response (CR) 
evocation. Pavlov can also be considered indirectly 
responsible for the original exploration of operant 
conditioning. J. Konorski, a pioneer in operant behavior 
studies, made several visits to Russia to interact with 
Pavlov’s laboratory (Chilingaryan, 2001). Konorski and 
Miller (1937) conducted an experiment showing that 
paw flexion elicited by shock could also be reinforced 
by food in deprived animals. Commenting on this 
experiment, Pavlov (1936/1986) concluded that the 
operant behavior had occurred because of the following 
events: (1) the paw’s movement was perceived by 
kinesthetic neurons, (2) this neural perception was 
paired with the unconditioned food reflex, (3) as a 
result of that pairing, food deprivation began triggering 
the kinesthetic neurons which, in turn, elicited the 
output paw flexion. Supposedly, the kinesthetic and 
motor neurons send projections to each other, so the 
paw’s movement can control and be controlled by the 
sensory neurons. In summary, in Pavlov’s view of the 
operant experiment conducted by Konorski and Miller, 
the antecedent stimulation of the kinesthetic neurons 
evoked the operant motor response. This conclusion 
follows from Pavlov’s reflex paradigm, which considers 
that any behavior should be attached to some kind of 
antecedent stimulus control.
Pavlov repeatedly emphasized that reflex physiology 
should provide the foundations for psychological 
functions. Although he usually described functional 
relations between observable variables, such as stimuli 
and responses, his focus was on the supposed underlying 
biological dynamics. Later, a different approach was 
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used by B. F. Skinner, who dismissed any reference 
to a physiological level when analyzing psychological 
phenomena. The behavioral laws described by Skinner 
refer exclusively to relations between environmental 
stimuli and responses. For Skinner, these environmental 
relations would be sufficient to understand and control 
behavior, and any mention of biology would be useless 
or even counterproductive in the construction of the 
independent science of behavior.
In the Skinnerian tradition, classical and operant 
contingencies are treated as independent units of 
analysis because the causal stimulus of the reflex is 
generally the antecedent stimulus, whereas the causal 
stimulus of operant behavior is the consequent stimulus 
(termed reinforcer). Nevertheless, a common element 
between both analytical units is the environmental 
selection of relations between antecedent stimuli and 
responses. In classical conditioning, the reinforcer is 
responsible for the selection of CS–CR relations and 
is the unconditioned stimulus (US) that precedes the 
unconditioned response (UR). In operant conditioning, 
the reinforcer (SR) is the stimulus that follows the 
response and selects relations between discriminative 
stimulus (SD) and operant response (SD–R relations).
Skinner was limited by the physiological 
knowledge of his lifetime and could not fully evaluate 
the role of neurophysiologic events in operant and 
classical contingencies of reinforcement. Although he 
admitted the importance of the developing physiology 
showing the organism’s inner changes during and 
after learning tasks (Skinner, 1974), he apparently 
subjected behavioral neuroscience to behavior analysis 
(Skinner, 1938, 1988a). The present article holds the 
view that the relationship among levels of behavioral 
and physiological analysis is bidirectional. Today’s 
psychology can take advantage of studies with drugs, 
specific brain lesions, and biochemical markers of neural 
networks correlated with behavioral events, in the same 
way that the psychology of Pavlov’s time benefited 
from implanting stomach fistulas or extirpating cerebral 
hemispheres of dogs.
A proposal for a unified principle of conditioning
Donahoe and Palmer (1994) suggested that the UR 
produced by the presentation of an intense or biologically 
relevant US sensitizes the organism to new sources of 
learning. This US-induced change in ongoing responses 
(i.e., the production of the UR) is called behavioral 
discrepancy, a theoretical concept that basically indicates 
a difference between ongoing and elicited behavior 
(Donahoe, 2003; Donahoe & Palmer, 1994).
Behavioral discrepancy would be the internal signal 
of environmental stimuli relevant to survival. The UR 
then emerges as the biological correlate of the US and 
also as the actual cause of conditioning. The primary 
function of the UR in classical conditioning was 
confirmed by Donahoe and Vegas (2004), who used the 
pigeon’s throat reflex (UR) in response to water (US), 
taking advantage of the natural delay between the US 
and UR typical of such a reflex. These authors varied 
pairing parameters between the CS and UR, including 
presenting the CS within the interval between the US 
and UR. In this last situation, CR evocation was verified 
(i.e., the US–CS–UR sequence reliably produced 
the CR, similar to the usual CS–US–UR sequence). 
Therefore, reverse conditioning was efficient, in which 
the CS follows the US.
Operant conditioning is also addressed here because 
the reinforcer, among other functions, is always an eliciting 
stimulus. Donahoe and Palmer (1994) considered that 
food has a reinforcing function and conditioning power 
because it first elicits changes in current responses (e.g., 
salivation) that sensitize the organism to the forthcoming 
(SR) and surrounding (SD) critical events.
Behavioral discrepancy appears to offer a 
parsimonious principle that serves both types of 
conditioning. Among the wide range of responses 
and stimuli occurring in a time continuum, the US is 
not preceded either by stimuli or responses, but it 
actually is always preceded by both. As a result, the 
US-produced discrepancy selects its better correlated 
precedent events (i.e., environmental events in the case 
of classical conditioning and behavioral events in the 
case of operant conditioning). When stimuli reliably 
precede the US, classical conditioning is in effect. When 
responses reliably precede the US, operant conditioning 
occurs. In this latter case, the SD is also selected because 
of its regular presence when discrepancy occurs.
The aforementioned theoretical considerations 
led Donahoe and Palmer (1994) to propose the unified 
principle of reinforcement, which states that classical 
and operant conditioning share the same unit of selection 
by reinforcement: environment–behavior relations. 
For convenience, the word reinforcement will be used 
herein as a generic term to refer to the selection of 
environment–behavior relations. If specifying whether 
the contingency is classical or operant is necessary, 
then the terms unconditioned stimulus (US) or primary 
reinforcer (SR) will be used, respectively.
The unified principle of conditioning settles on a neural basis
Donahoe and Palmer (1994) and Donahoe, Palmer, 
and Burgos (1997) inferred that antecedent stimuli 
always have a causal function in evocated responses. 
Responses are intrinsically linked to stimulus control. 
At the neural level, this relational function can be 
characterized by altering anatomic connections and 
the efficacy of synapses between sensory neurons (the 
stimulus pathways) and motor neurons (the response 
pathways). The learning history of an organism requires 
changes in brain anatomy and physiology because 
environment–behavior relations are strengthened as 
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neural connections. Such connections would cover the 
temporal gaps between the current learning and the later 
expression of learning.  
The neural connections proposed by Donahoe 
and Palmer (1994) and Donahoe et al. (1997) add a 
pivotal biological feature to the “unified principle of 
reinforcement.” This biobehavioral principle includes the 
neurosciences inside of behavior analysis. From a biological 
perspective of behavioral phenomena, reinforcement 
simply strengthens connections among neurons. Neural 
circuits of reinforcement would take part in ontogenetic 
selection, similar to genes in phylogenesis (Silva, 2005). 
This is why stimulus control by an antecedent stimulus 
guides behavior. In a given context, the currently activated 
synapses are virtually the same synapses strengthened 
during learning within this context.
Role of neural events in behavioral contingencies
The traditional view of behavior analysis of 
contingencies avoids intraorganic relations and 
considers only interrelations between the organism and 
external environment as truly behavioral phenomena. 
Skinner and skinnerians always maintained that only a 
purely behavioral approach is able to predict and control 
behavior (Baum, 1994; Catania, 1998; Chiesa, 1994; 
Donahoe & Palmer, 1994; Sidman, 1960; Skinner, 
1953), and neurosciences could only describe what 
occurs in an organism while it behaves in mechanical 
terms (Skinner, 1953, 1974).
Several behavior analysts, however, assert 
that internal/biological events may occur based on 
reinforcement contingencies (Silva, Gonçalves, & 
Garcia-Mijares, 2007). Morris, Lazo and Smith (2004, 
p. 165) consider that, in a behavioral system, “the 
variables of which behavior is a function lie outside 
behavior, but not outside the organism.” McIlvane and 
Dube (1997) share this opinion and affirm that neural 
antecedents might serve as links of a behavioral chain, 
rather than merely a physiological chain.
DiFiore et al. (2000) suggest that the knowledge of 
cerebral wave patterns may provide insights into correct 
interventions in people with developmental deficits. 
For example, two wave patterns are related to stimulus 
processing. An initial pattern is related to sensory 
contact with the stimulus, and another wave pattern 
correlates with abstract behavior milliseconds later. 
Abnormal patterns could then reveal whether perceptual 
or language deficits are present. Normal patterns, in 
contrast, could reveal potential performance even in the 
absence of overt response and help people with motor 
disorders such as cerebral palsy. Therefore, brain waves 
may be a reliable indicator of behavioral discrimination 
when responses are not readily detectable.
Skinner (1988b, p. 485) mentioned the feasibility 
of giving neural events the same status as muscular 
responses: “I see no reason why we should not call 
the action of efferent nerves behavior either, since no 
muscular response is needed for reinforcement.”
Neural analysis and the integration of conditioning 
paradigms
Brain activity is topographically very distinct from 
responses observed at the behavioral level, which does 
not mean that they have a distinct nature. The organism 
is always the one that behaves, and behavior is expressed 
through the hands, speech organs, and brain (Silva et al., 
2007). Behavior analysis follows the same principles 
for both neural and muscular responses. Reinforced 
responses may bypass the brain and involve only the 
spinal cord and muscles (e.g., the operant strengthening 
of motor responses in transected animals) (Gómez-
Pinilla et al., 2007). Reinforced responses may also be 
only cerebral. For example, rats accurately learned to 
obtain a reinforcer only by emitting a neural pattern 
that correlated with the bar pressing response (Nicolelis 
& Chapin, 2002). Additionally, rats discriminated the 
cortical stimulation SD that signaled different directions 
to follow to obtain the reinforcer (i.e., mesocortical 
stimulation) (Talwar et al., 2002). In both examples, 
which will be discussed in more detail later, neural 
events served as the SD, response, or SR, depending on 
the programmed contingency.
An important issue is the analytic unit of behavior 
analysis that is assessed in the central nervous system. 
Is it a single neuron, a set of neurons, or a circuit? 
Even a single neuron emits an operant response 
analog (Fetz & Finocchio, 1971). If learning depends 
on strengthening synapses, considering individual 
neuron activity as the main dependent variable of brain 
activity is unfeasible (Donahoe et al., 1997). Possibly 
because of this, increased activity was not found when 
reinforcement contingencies existed for individual 
neuronal discharges in a hippocampal slice. However, 
reinforcement was successful for discharges in trains, 
which are more representative of synaptic activity 
(Stein, Xue, & Belluzzi, 1993). Should more neurons 
be observed so that their joint action establishes a 
response to be reinforced? A relevant datum came from 
the aforementioned experiment by Nicolelis and Chapin 
(2002), in which the reinforced activity of a small set of 
neurons replaced operant motor responses.
Brain activity can play a role in behavior analysis. A 
detailed description of neural function could contribute 
to improvements in the knowledge of conditioning 
paradigms. Classical and operant learning has not 
only the aforementioned common theoretical basis, 
but also common brain structures, pathways, and 
neurotransmitters. Could common neural mechanisms 
match stimulus control for both types of conditioning? 
Could brain data strengthen Donahoe and Palmer’s 
(1994) view that reinforcement, no matter to which 
conditioning, simply selects environment–behavior 
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relations (i.e., associations between antecedent stimuli 
and responses)? The present paper evaluates whether 
the behavioral analysis of neural variables may reveal 
similarities between the nature of classical and operant 
conditioning by focusing mainly on stimulus control of 
learning tasks. The aim is to consider a feasible single 
conditioning category based on the vast literature about 
the neural side of behavioral phenomena.
Description and analysis of neural events 
in conditioning
Brief description of the reinforcement circuit
In the historic experiment by Olds and Milner (1954), 
non-deprived rats tirelessly worked for electrical stimulation 
of the limbic septal area. This paper opened a vast field 
directed toward elucidating the structures, circuits, and 
cellular and molecular processes activated by conditioning. 
Today, the most accepted theories of the neural basis of 
conditioning in mammals involve a set of limbic structures 
activated by the neurotransmitter dopamine. Dopamine 
is released when the organism is presented with stimuli 
relevant to learning, such as unconditioned, conditioned, 
reinforcing, and discriminative stimuli. The activity of 
dopaminergic neurons is sensitive to different presentation 
probabilities of such stimuli.
A very simplified description of the main structures 
and neural pathways related to learning will now be 
presented. Dopaminergic pathways linking mesencephalic 
structures to limbic structures are pivotal for reinforcement 
efficacy. Specifically, activation of the substantia nigra 
and ventral tegmental area causes dopamine release in the 
striatum and nucleus accumbens, where dopamine serves 
as a neural signal of behavioral discrepancy.
The caudate nucleus and putamen are part of the 
striatum, a complex whose influence on motor function 
has been widely confirmed by experimental and clinical 
findings. For example, the caudate-putamen and its two 
efferent pathways, the globus pallidus and substantia 
nigra, are involved in the difficulty to initiate movements 
and muscular rigidity observed in Parkinson’s disease 
(Heimer, 1994; Saint-Cyr, 2003). The caudate receives 
cortical inputs from associative areas, including the 
frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices, and the putamen 
receives glutamatergic excitatory inputs from motor and 
somatosensory cortices. Because of such cortical inputs, 
Heimer (1994) concluded that the putamen constitutes the 
main striatal motor structure. Conversely, clinical evidence 
indicates that pathologies related to the caudate hinder 
complex behaviors, thus leading to behavioral disturbances 
such as abulia or impulsiveness (Mesulam, 2000).
The nucleus accumbens is located in the ventral 
portion of the striatal complex, and because of its specific 
input and output networks, it forms an interface between 
motor (e.g., dorsal striatum), motivational (e.g., ventral 
tegmental area, hippocampus, and hypothalamus), 
and associative systems (e.g., cerebral cortex). The 
main dopaminergic input of the nucleus accumbens 
comes from the ventral tegmental area. Other inputs 
mainly deliver glutamate to the nucleus accumbens. 
Such projections come from frontal and orbitofrontal 
cortices, the temporal lobe, the basolateral amygdala, 
and the hippocampal formation, the latter of which is 
considered an important structure in strengthening 
synapses of memory for recent events (Nestler, Hyman, 
& Malenka, 2001). Efferent pathways of motor areas 
are similar to those of the caudate-putamen and link 
to the substantia nigra, globus pallidus, subthalamic 
nucleus, and prefrontal cortex via the thalamus (Martin, 
1998). The nucleus accumbens is intimately involved in 
emotional and cognitive function, particularly because 
of its connections with the thalamus, limbic system, and 
virtually the entire cerebral cortex (DeLong, 2000).
Similar cytological characteristics indicate that the 
nucleus accumbens and caudate-putamen form a single 
striatal complex. Therefore, the nucleus accumbens 
and caudate-putamen are commonly referred to 
as, respectively, the ventral striatum and dorsal 
striatum. However, behavioral, pharmacological, and 
physiological data show that the nucleus accumbens 
and caudate-putamen are involved in distinct aspects of 
behavior. For example, dopaminergic enhancers, such 
as amphetamine and apomorphine, produce locomotor 
hyperactivity at low doses and motor stereotypy at 
high doses. These patterns are probably attributable to 
dopaminergic release in the nucleus accumbens and 
dorsal striatum, respectively, because (1) lesions of 
the entire striatal complex hinders both hyperactivity 
and stereotypy, and (2) lesions of only the nucleus 
accumbens or intra-accumbens administration of 
dopaminergic antagonists hinders only hyperactivity 
(Deutch, Bourdelais, & Zahm, 1993). 
The nucleus accumbens is also internally divided into 
anatomically and functionally distinct structures: the core 
and shell. The core has morphology similar to the caudate-
putamen, whereas the shell resembles the extended 
amygdala (Heimer, 1994). Behavioral data appear to 
corroborate the nucleus accumbens anatomy because the 
core is intimately related to motor responses, and the shell 
is mainly related to motivation. For example, the shell is 
mainly involved in moderate stress, and the involvement of 
the core increases when an intense or long-lasting stressor 
evokes motor responses of high magnitude (Deutch et al., 
1993). The shell of the nucleus accumbens is also more 
sensitive to addictive drugs, such as cocaine, amphetamine, 
nicotine, and opioids, which increase dopamine release in 
the shell (Kupfermann, Kandel, & Iversen, 2000). The 
shell networks are also “motivational” and substantially 
connected to the amygdala and autonomic and endocrine 
centers of the hypothalamus and brainstem, structures that 
control sexual, defensive, aggressive, and fear behavior 
(Heimer, 1994).
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Importantly, although the nucleus accumbens 
represents the most promising convergent site of 
conditioning events, the behavioral function of 
dopamine is not restricted to its activity in the nucleus 
accumbens. For example, phencyclidine and cocaine are 
self-administered directly into the nucleus accumbens 
and prefrontal cortex, and cocaine is more avidly self-
administered directly into the olfactory tubercle than the 
nucleus accumbens. Additionally, both dopamine and 
dopaminergic agonists apparently facilitate conditioning 
and improve performance even when they are administered 
into the amygdala, hippocampus, and caudate nucleus 
(dorsal striatum). Therefore, the relationship between 
dopaminergic activity and behavioral learning goes 
beyond the nucleus accumbens (Wise, 2004).
Behavioral data derived mainly from appetitive 
conditioning studies appear to converge on the aforementioned 
anatomical pathways. The corresponding physiological 
processes will be detailed in the following sections.
Brief note on dopamine and behavior
Dopamine is a basic neurotransmitter for several 
complex behaviors, and its malfunctioning, for example, 
is related to motor symptoms in Parkinson’s disease 
and attentional and cognitive deficits in schizophrenia 
(Alves, Guerra, & Silva, 1999; Heimer, 1994; Lubow, 
1998). The importance of dopamine in positive 
reinforcement mechanisms has been widely supported 
by several experiments and is frequently mentioned in 
review articles and textbooks (e.g., Donahoe & Palmer, 
1994; McKim, 2007; Wise, 2004).
Dopaminergic system manipulations have substantial 
effects on conditioning. Systemic administration of 
dopaminergic antagonists attenuates the reinforcing 
value of several stimuli, such as water, food, sexual 
contact, amphetamine, cocaine, and electrical stimulation 
of the hypothalamus (Wise, 2004). Dopaminergic 
depletion, therefore, simulates the reinforcer devaluation 
observed in alimentary satiation (Morgan, 1974). When 
administration of dopaminergic antagonists occurs 
before conditioning, learning simply does not occur; if 
administration occurs after conditioning, then learned 
responses resurge as soon as the dopaminergic system 
returns to normal functioning (Wise, 2004). Moreover, 
intermittent administration of the dopaminergic 
antagonist haloperidol causes resistance to extinction 
indistinguishable from that produced by intermittent 
positive reinforcement (Ettenberg & Camp, 1986a, b). 
This finding suggests that partial non-reinforcement 
by dopaminergic activation may constitute a biological 
parallel of partial non-reinforcement by food or water 
in traditional operant procedures. Conversely, dopamine 
agonists facilitate response learning in either primary or 
secondary reinforcement (Wise, 2004). Better operant 
performance is obtained, for example, after the injection 
of amphetamine, an indirect dopamine agonist, into the 
nucleus accumbens (Taylor & Robbins, 1984), whereas 
dopamine antagonists reverse the amphetamine-induced 
effect (Wolterink et al., 1993). 
Dopaminergic cells also influence classical 
conditioning notably associated with attentional behavior. 
For example, a substantial dopamine discharge of single 
neurons has been observed upon the presentation of a 
novel appetitive US (Schultz, 1999).
Glutamate is intimately related with dopamine in 
conditioning processes (Kelley, 2004; Nestler et al., 
2001). The most accepted hypothesis of the neural 
modulation of reinforcement states that dopaminergic 
inputs from the ventral tegmental area modulate the 
activity of synaptic terminals within the nucleus 
accumbens coming from glutamatergic cortical neurons. 
However, the role of glutamate as a neural signal of 
discrepancy and modulation agent for γ-aminobutyric 
acid-ergic nucleus accumbens neurons remains a theory 
that lacks further substantiation. The role of dopamine 
in behavioral processes is uncontested, and this 
neurotransmitter has priority in the present article.
Dopaminergic mesencephalic afferents of the nucleus 
accumbens and conditioning
The knowledge of dopaminergic function in 
conditioning processes has substantially improved 
with the electrophysiological research of W. Schultz 
and colleagues. In their studies, the focus relied on 
the firing of individual dopaminergic neurons in two 
mesencephalic structures, the substantia nigra and 
ventral tegmental area, which are related to motor 
activity and motivation, respectively. According to 
Schultz (1999), dopaminergic neurons signal the 
presentation of relevant events, which can be an 
appetitive stimulus, its antecedent, or a novel stimulus. 
If the event is aversive, then the dopaminergic signal 
is not sustained.
To demonstrate that a relevant event has occurred, 
a momentary increase in the firing rate of most 
mesocortical dopaminergic neurons is observed in 
various limbic and cortical regions. This general 
dopaminergic signal, as assumed by Schultz, modulates 
active corticostriatal synapses at the moment of 
reinforcement. For the purpose of learning, the 
reinforcer and its biological correlate (i.e., dopamine 
neuron firing) link to their accompanying contiguous 
events (the CS or SD and its related corticostriatal 
synapses). The temporal contiguity (in addition to the 
actual causality, according to Rescorla, 1988) between 
events is a basic condition of the processes of classical 
and operant conditioning. Additionally, dopamine 
reuptake is not immediate, which permits its prolonged 
action in the corticostriatal synapses to be selected.
In addition to supposedly acting as a global signal 
of unexpected reinforcement, dopamine has other 
important functions in conditioning, demonstrated by the 
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examples below that were extracted from experiments 
that measured, in real time, the activity of individual 
neurons of monkeys:
(1) Dopaminergic mesencephalic neurons showed 
an increased firing rate in response to an unpredicted 
appetitive US during the initial trials of classical 
conditioning. When this US no longer implied behavioral 
discrepancy or novelty, dopaminergic activity returned 
to baseline levels, and a transference of cell firing to 
the CS presentations occurred. After learning became 
stable, dopaminergic overactivation was no longer 
altered by the presentation of the (now predicted) US 
(Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003).
(2) Dopaminergic mesencephalic neurons showed 
a decreased firing rate when the predicted US was 
not presented. This datum could also be explained by 
behavioral discrepancy because a predicted event did not 
actually occur (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).
(3) When an interval was interposed between 
the CS and US, the firing rate of dopaminergic 
mesencephalic cells gradually increased and reached 
maximum values immediately before the US, which is 
evidence of temporal discrimination. This phenomenon 
was noteworthy when distinct CSs were employed to 
indicate different reinforcement probabilities—the 
greater the level of uncertainty about reinforcement, the 
greater the neuronal activity (Fiorillo et al., 2003).
(4) In a go/no-go task, distinct visual SDs indicated 
to monkeys whether they should, for few seconds, hold 
a joystick or release it and move their hand toward a 
target to obtain a delayed SR (fruit juice). Neurons in 
the caudate were gradually more active during the 
interval between the SD and SR, and putamen neurons 
became more active during those few seconds between 
the SD and the release movement. Neither the caudate 
nor putamen neurons altered their baseline activity 
when a third SD indicated that the task would not be 
reinforced, suggesting discrimination of the context 
for reinforcement at the neuronal level (Schultz, 2000; 
Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2003). Therefore, the 
behavioral data by Schultz (2000) and Schultz et al. 
(2003) are consistent with neuroanatomical data that 
indicate that the caudate receives inputs from associative 
cortical areas, and the putamen receives inputs from the 
motor cortex (Heimer, 1994).
The dopaminergic system is involved in behavioral 
discrepancy caused by both US detection (items 1 and 
2 above) and the level of uncertainty of US presentation 
(item 3 above). Moreover, the dopaminergic system can 
transfer the US-eliciting properties to the antecedent 
stimulus (item 1 above) and shows selectivity in procedures 
of contingency discrimination (item 4 above).
W. Schultz purported that the dopamine released 
by mesencephalic neurons in the substantia nigra and 
ventral tegmental area generates a global reinforcement 
signal to striatal and cortical areas. The dopaminergic 
signal could interact, for example, with the prefrontal 
cortex and one of its subdivisions, the orbitofrontal 
cortex, which will be shown to react sensitively to 
antecedent stimuli and the reinforcer value.
Cortical afferents of the nucleus accumbens and conditioning
The prefrontal cortex greatly intervenes in behavioral 
processes because of its important projections to the 
nucleus accumbens and massive interconnections with 
associative cortical areas. These latter networks allow 
information coming from different sensory modalities 
(such as somatosensory, gustative, and visual inputs) 
to be codified and integrated in the prefrontal cortex 
(Mesulam, 2000). Such a richness of sensory afferents 
distinguishes prefrontal neurons from dopaminergic 
mesencephalic neurons, which provide a general signal 
for the presence of relevant stimuli (Rolls, 2000). The 
prefrontal cortex, therefore, is an excellent site for 
the establishment of neural connections correlated 
with associated stimuli. As such, it must be sensitive 
to tasks involving changes in stimulus control and 
learning of discriminative responses. For example, 
patients with prefrontal lesions show remarkable social 
maladjustment, indicating a loss of stimulus control at 
the level of environmental processes.
Orbitofrontal lesions cause substantial deficits in 
discrimination reversal performance in rats (Chudasama 
& Robbins, 2003) and monkeys (Butter, 1969; Jones 
& Mishkin, 1972). Animals persist in responding 
under original stimulus control. Consistent with these 
findings, monkeys with orbitofrontal lesions are also 
insensitive to the extinction procedure (Butter, 1969; 
Rolls, 2000) and continue to respond as if the previous 
reinforcement contingency was still active. When the 
brain is working normally, extinction matches increased 
orbitofrontal activity, confirmed by mapping human 
brain activity when face figures (the CS) are no longer 
paired with unpleasant odors (the US) (Gottfried & 
Dolan, 2004). Discrimination reversal also depends on 
dopamine modulation in the ventral striatum, notably 
the caudate and nucleus accumbens, possibly because 
of striato-frontal networks (Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, 
& Robbins, 2007; Roberts, 2008).
Stimulus control is also linked to the orbitofrontal 
cortex in tasks involving the discrimination of reinforcing 
value. Discriminative responses of orbitofrontal neurons 
in monkeys were evoked by visual SDs that signaled 
two appetitive SRs, raisins and apples. These neurons 
differentially responded to the preferred SR (i.e., raisins) 
and its corresponding SD. Later, the raisins were replaced 
by cereal, and then the apple became the preferred 
choice. Interestingly, neurons responded to the apple 
and its SD, similar to the previous responses to raisins. 
Thus, the crucial variables here are not the physical 
properties of the presented reinforcers, but rather their 
relative value (Hassani, Cromwell, & Schultz, 2001; 
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Schultz, 2000, 2004; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). 
These data appear to parallel an experiment by Nicola, 
Yun, Wakabayashi, and Fields (2004), which showed 
differential discharges in nucleus accumbens neurons in 
three situations: the absence of the SD and the presence 
of the SD followed or not by a discriminative response 
(i.e., nosepoke reinforced by sucrose). Discriminative 
responses of nucleus accumbens neurons signaled the 
presence of the SD, and they still “informed” whether an 
operant response would be emitted. As noted by Nicola 
et al. (2004), the discriminative response from nucleus 
accumbens neurons possibly derives from the massive 
glutamatergic input from the orbitofrontal cortex.
Relevant data have also been derived from the 
prefrontal cortex. Matsumoto, Suzuki, and Tanaka 
(2003) recorded the activity of prefrontal neurons in 
monkeys exposed to a go/no-go procedure, in which 
distinct SDs signaled reinforcement for moving a 
joystick or holding it without changing its course. The 
peculiarity of this procedure is the interposition of a 
time interval between these SDs and a go stimulus, 
which merely signals that the motor response must 
be initiated. Several visual SDs were used, and their 
function could be reversed in different trial blocks to 
guarantee the independence of the physical properties of 
the SD. The neural records during the interval between 
SD presentation and response emission showed that 
(1) some neurons fired only in reinforced trials, (2) 
other neurons fired only in non-reinforced trials, and 
(3) a third set of neurons fired in response to specific 
contingencies, such as SD → move the joystick → SR+, 
SD → do not move the joystick → SR+, or SΔ → any 
response → absence of SR+. In summary, contingencies 
that produce overt discriminated responses also produce 
consistently differentiated neural activity, and prefrontal 
activity consistent with discriminated overt responses 
can precede these.
Even more impressive are the data from 
Schoenbaum, Chiba, and Gallagher (1999) on early 
neural discrimination. These authors recorded the 
activity of neurons from the basolateral amygdale1 
which, similar to frontal cortical areas, sends massive 
projections to the nucleus accumbens. In different trials, 
rats were exposed to different odors that signaled the 
availability of two drinking stimuli: a pleasant sucrose 
solution or an aversive quinine solution (the latter 
of which could be avoided by simply waiting for the 
end of the trial). New odors were introduced in every 
session, and the odors that were already used could 
have their function reversed to ensure the control by the 
contingencies and not by the chemical properties of the 
odors. Therefore, the animals had to constantly relearn 
the contingencies signaled by the changeable SDs. The 
results clearly demonstrated discriminative neuronal 
responses to the positive or aversive contingencies. In 
fact, discrimination occurred as soon as the animals 
smelled the odors before they could reach the solution 
dispenser, which showed that responding was controlled 
by the SD and not by the SR. However, the most impressive 
results showed that in every block the discrimination at 
the neuronal level was observed before the behavioral 
discrimination (i.e., neural accuracy always preceded 
behavioral accuracy), and stimulus control effectively 
impacted neural activity even when rats were still 
drinking quinine. Notice that this precocious response 
of amygdala neurons was observed trials before the 
achievement of good behavioral performance and did 
not merely anticipate behavior during single trials, 
which was observed by Matsumoto et al. (2003), 
Schultz (2000), and Schultz et al. (2003). Schoenbaum 
et al. (1999) also found that the discriminative activity 
of orbitofrontal cortex neurons precisely correlated 
with behavioral discrimination. The “delay” in the 
orbitofrontal cortex regarding the amygdala and the 
“punctuality” regarding the behavioral responses are 
compatible with the orbitofrontal anatomical-functional 
properties of integrating information in motor planning. 
Prefrontal regions receive many low-level inputs. Some 
of these, such as the amygdala input, do not promptly, if 
at all, control behavior (Wallis, 2008). In such a case, the 
early discrimination from the amygdala appears to be an 
important example of a subtle and complex cognitive 
process that supposedly competes with other associative 
areas prior to the selection of an output response.
The refined results from experiments using neural 
responses as dependent variables make even clearer 
the adequacy of neural events as the object of study 
of behavioral science. In the future, other cognitive or 
emotional signals will certainly be able to be decoded to 
help solve human problems. Nature does not distinguish 
physical events from mental events, and this is the reason 
why even thoughts—in the form of discriminative 
responses or anticipation to movements—have a 
material component subject to measurement.
Up to this point, anatomical and functional properties 
of conditioning processes have been analyzed. Now we 
must understand what happens at the cellular level.
In vitro operant conditioning in mammalian neurons
The operant response extensively studied in intact 
organisms may also be emitted by single and isolated neurons. 
Stein and Belluzzi (1989), Stein et al. (1993), and Stein, Xue, 
and Belluzzi (1994) studied operant responses of individual 
in vitro cells from the hippocampus of rats. Their procedure 
involved basic and elegant response shaping.
After exhibiting a baseline firing pattern, the 
hippocampal cells received postsynaptic dopamine or 
dopamine agonists contingent on the emission of that 
pattern. The action potential train (burst) frequency 
1According to Mesulam (2000), the amygdala is part of the 
cerebral cortex and because of its simplified cytoarchitecture 
is designed as a corticoid structure.
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requirement for the dopamine injection gradually 
increased. Other cells received glutamate contingent on the 
response. Neurons receiving dopamine and dopaminergic 
agonists, but not glutamate, showed increased frequency 
of activity bursts, indicating that even individual in vitro 
neurons could show operant learning2.
In the studies led by L. Stein, the increase in frequency 
was obtained only when reinforcement was contingent 
on bursts, not on isolated action potentials (spikes). 
This suggested to Donahoe et al. (1997) that dopamine 
has the function of selecting synaptic connections (not 
only responses) through the mechanism of postsynaptic 
long-term potentiation (LTP) because the synaptic 
glutamate release that produces greater sensitivity 
of the postsynaptic neuron depends on the bursts of 
the hippocampal presynaptic neurons. Donahoe and 
colleagues further assumed that the sequence of bursts 
reinforced by dopamine in experiments by L. Stein may 
also be caused in intact organisms by signals released 
from potentiated postsynaptic neurons. These retrograde 
signals (a candidate is nitric oxide, according to Deutch 
& Roth, 1999) would reach presynaptic neurons and 
alter their activity.
In the previous topics, the systemic aspects of 
reinforcement were expressed within specific circuitry. 
In the present topic, the operant learning also emerges as 
a property of hippocampal neurons and perhaps neurons 
of other brain areas that, similar to the hippocampus, 
play a role in reinforcement circuitry.
In vitro and in vivo operant and classical conditioning 
in mollusk neurons
The cellular basis of learning has begun to be 
well established. However, the specificity of cellular 
processes can be even more refined when central 
nervous system features are more easily accessed. This 
is the case with the mollusk Aplysia californica. Aplysia 
has a very simple and well known nervous system, 
containing approximately only 20,000 neurons, which 
makes it an excellent model to study the relationships 
between neurons and behavior. Studies of the neuronal 
foundations of operant behavior based on this mollusk 
are developing. From a series of experiments with 
positive reinforcement, the team led by J. H. Byrne 
suggested a possible basic site for conditioning, located 
in neurons of the buccal ganglia.
In Aplysia, food intake has as its neuronal correlate 
the activation of esophageal neurons, which carries the 
dopaminergic reinforcement signal to other systems. 
In an in vitro preparation, Nargeot, Baxter, and Byrne 
(1997) and Brembs, Baxter, and Byrne (2004) applied 
electrical pulses to the esophageal nerve when the buccal 
nerve exhibited a motor pattern typical of alimentary 
behavior. Activation of the esophageal nerve was 
presented as the reinforcer for responses from buccal 
nerves. These responses were also elicited by antecedent 
tonic stimulation of the buccal nerve to create a baseline. 
The results showed a significant increase in the response 
from buccal nerves when the SR was administered 
immediately after the response or with a short delay 
between them, and the response was extinguished when 
the tonic stimulation was not followed by the reinforcer. 
Nargeot et al. (1997) also found discrimination with 
regard to the antecedent tonic stimulation signaling 
reinforcement. After a period without stimulation (and, 
consequently, with virtually absent spontaneous response 
emissions), responding resumed its vigor as soon as the 
stimulation was presented again. The similarity with an 
autoshaping procedure must be noticed. The response 
initially elicited by tonic stimulation during baseline 
began to be controlled also by its consequence, and the 
antecedent stimulus became an operant SD, in addition 
to its classical function.
Neurons of the esophageal nerve contain dopamine, 
which once more emerges as a neurotransmitter for sensory 
signals of external events. The operant conditioning of the 
buccal nerve response was hindered by administration of 
the dopaminergic antagonist methylergonovine (Nargeot, 
Baxter, Patterson, & Byrne, 1999).
A specific buccal neuron, called B51, was especially 
sensitive to operant conditioning and showed plasticity 
properties caused by learning. Dopamine reinforcement 
effects on the activity of B51 removed from naive 
animals produced the same increased membrane 
excitability that was observed in neuron B51 of intact 
animals after food reinforcement (Brembs, Lorenzetti, 
Reyes, Baxter, & Byrne, 2002). In addition to providing 
additional evidence of the relevance of dopamine, this 
datum established that neuron B51 is a possible site of 
convergence for operant behavior and the reinforcing 
stimulus. The interest in the molecular mechanisms of 
Aplysia’s buccal dopaminergic neurons then increased. 
Barbas et al. (2006) succeeded in cloning active 
dopamine1-like receptors in that mollusk.
Byrne’s team were interested in the similarities 
between classical and operant conditioning paradigms 
and investigated whether neuron B51 could be a cellular 
site that links reflexive and operant behavior (Lorenzetti, 
Mozzachiodi, Baxter, & Byrne, 2006). Neuron B51 is 
pivotal for alimentary behavior because its depolarization 
elicits neural patterns correlated with the biting response 
(which is basically a response for food ingestion), and 
its hyperpolarization inhibits such patterns. Therefore, it 
is a neuron critical for eliciting neural food patterns and 
is also sensitive to the consequences of these patterns. 
In a study by Lorenzetti et al. (2006), the objective was 
to verify whether the classical conditioning could also 
change the properties of B51. In in vivo and in vitro 
preparations, a tactile or neural CS (i.e., stimulation 
2 The neurons that were not reinforced by postsynaptic 
glutamate are known to show LTP under the action of 
presynaptic glutamate.
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of nerve AT4) was paired with presentation of food or 
stimulation of the esophageal nerve. These pairings 
resulted in conditioned elicitation of in vivo biting 
responses and in vitro neural biting patterns. Following 
training, neuron B51 of dissected animals and neuron 
B51 directly trained in vitro showed equal plasticity, 
demonstrating replication between the in vivo and in vitro 
data. Unlike what happened in operant conditioning, 
diminished excitability of B51 was found in classical 
conditioning. However, such diminished excitability 
was compensated by the increased efficacy of synaptic 
input over B51 through the CS pathway. This made B51 
generally more active. Briefly, decreased excitability 
would hinder and increased synaptic efficacy would 
facilitate the production of biting by neuron B51. 
Overall, some results with classical conditioning are 
similar to those obtained with operant conditioning. For 
example, the reinforcement pathway (esophageal nerve) 
and transmitter involved (dopamine) are the same, and 
B51 is a common cellular site of plasticity (Baxter & 
Byrne, 2006; Lorenzetti et al., 2006). Nonetheless, the 
excitability factor disclosed a fundamental difference 
because operant responses would be facilitated by the 
properties of the neuron itself, and reflex responses 
would be facilitated by synapse properties (Baxter & 
Byrne, 2006; Brembs et al., 2002).
Considering the above experimental description, the 
significant similarity between reinforcement mechanisms 
found in different species of animals must be stressed. 
For example, dopamine’s role is uncontested, and it 
commonly interacts with glutamate in intact organisms. 
Notably, reinforcement mechanisms involve aspects 
common to mollusks and mammals and some of their 
individual neurons.
Neural events can replace behavioral events in 
operant contingency
Technical developments in neurosciences simulated, 
directly in the brain, the elements of a contingency. 
In a study by Talwar et al. (2002), rats discriminated 
electrical stimulations in cortical regions representing 
the vibrissae, which served as a signal for them to 
move to the left or right. Reinforcement was electrical 
stimulation directly applied to the medial forebrain 
bundle (MFB), which links the ventral tegmental area 
and nucleus accumbens. The animals learned the task 
very well, based only on internal stimulation serving as 
the SD and SR. Thus, the function of an external SD and 
appetitive SR was simulated within the organism. Also, 
the reinforced response can be neural. In an experiment by 
Nicolelis and Chapin (2002), rats and monkeys obtained 
appetitive reinforcers contingent on the emission of a 
neural activity pattern from the motor cortex, which 
had been correlated with a previously shaped operant 
motor response. A noticeable increase in the frequency 
of such a pattern was recorded, which demonstrated 
reinforcement. Another relevant datum from the above 
experiment is that capturing activity only from a small 
neuronal population (50-100 neurons) was sufficient for 
an algorithm to code real-time neural activity correlated 
with the operant motor response and to transmit such 
information for the system to release reinforcement 
contingent on that neural pattern. The precision of 
the algorithm was so great that it could anticipate the 
topography of arm movements performed by monkeys. 
Therefore, neural responses can be reinforced similarly 
to movements, and even the activity of a few dozens of 
neurons can be the response unit to be reinforced.
When an associative cortical area is some 
synapses distant from the neural output of the operant 
response, its activity record tends to reveal aspects of 
response planning, rather than performance (Hoshi, 
2008; Scherberger and Andersen, 2007). Among the 
research on antecedent stimulus function and motor 
planning, the experiment by Musallam, Corneil, 
Greger, Scherberger, and Andersen (2004) must be 
highlighted. These authors implanted electrodes in the 
brains of monkeys in a parietal area that intermediates 
visual and premotor cortices and precedes reaching 
movements by various synapses. In their procedure, 
each time a SD was shown on a screen, its specific 
position should be touched after approximately 1.5 s. 
An algorithm decoded neural activity prior to specific 
movements and thus could foresee during the 1.5 s 
interval the position that the animal’s hand would 
reach. Thus, real movement could be dispensed, 
and the animal’s “intention” could be reinforced. 
Subsequently, two SDs indicated different quantities, 
qualities, and probabilities of the reinforcer, and the 
algorithm prediction became even more accurate 
when the SD signaled a preferred reinforcer variation. 
In summary, operant neural responses can reliably 
precede operant motor responses, similar to the study 
by Schoenbaum et al. (1999) regarding discrimination, 
showing that neural accuracy precedes behavioral 
accuracy. Moreover, neural responses also indicate the 
value of positive reinforcers. According to Musallam 
et al. (2004), the decoding of parietal activity revealed 
a correlate of “thought” that could be a neural basis 
of intentions and expectations. The assumption of 
the neural collection of thoughts should be seriously 
considered because information from the parietal 
cortex still must traverse a long way to produce a motor 
response and must at least pass through the premotor 
and primary motor cortices.
A possible application derived from these methods 
for reinforcing or reading neural responses is the 
development of equipment for assessing people with 
motor dysfunction, who generally have vision-related 
areas preserved. These areas can therefore provide 
signals of intentional movement. Neural knowledge 
turns to complex aspects of behavior, as in this case of 
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concomitant coding, in associative cerebral areas of 
visual, motor, and motivational information (Musallam 
et al., 2004). As discussed below, other associative areas, 
such as the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, also play a 
role in learning complex relations involved in cognition.
Cerebral structures and neural events in symbolic relations
The stimulus equivalence paradigm involves creating 
arbitrary categories formed by stimuli that do not have 
physical similarities. The paradigm is thus considered 
a basis for symbolic stimulus association and complex 
stimulus control. In equivalent class formation, different 
pairs of sample and comparison stimuli (e.g., A1B1, 
A1C1, A2B2, and A2C2) must be grouped according to a 
procedure of conditional discrimination called matching-
to-sample. Conditional to the presentation of a single 
sample stimulus in each trial (e.g., A1 in one trial, A2 
in another trial) is only one correct comparison stimulus 
(comparison B1 when A1 is the sample, or comparison 
B2 when A2 is the sample). Each sample presentation 
has at least two presented comparisons (B1 and B2). 
Only the choice of the correct comparison is reinforced 
(if the sample is A1, then the choice of B1 is reinforced, 
and the incorrect choice of B2 is not). Certain stimuli, 
called nodes, are the link that allows grouping stimuli 
that were not paired during the reinforced training (for 
reinforced AB and AC training, A is the node between 
B and C). After the training, tests are conducted under 
extinction conditions, and the establishment of pairs that 
were not directly reinforced is expected. These novel 
correct pairings are referred to as emergent relations, 
including symmetry (B1A1, C1A1, B2A2, and C2A2) 
and transitivity relations (B1C1, C1B1, B2C2, and 
C2B2). Through such a procedure, arbitrary stimuli of 
the same class become replaceable and share behavioral 
functions. An event may then be referred to through its 
substitute, and symbolic knowledge is said to emerge.
In studies of neuroscience and symbolic behavior, 
much has been investigated about the function of the 
hippocampus and connected associative areas because 
they are involved in memory and appear to play a role 
in establishing symbolic relations between stimuli 
(Mesulam, 2000; Miyashita, 2004). Relations emerging 
from symmetry and transitivity in rats with an injured 
hippocampus were studied by Bunsey and Eichenbaum 
(1996). Conditional discriminations AB and BC were 
trained, in addition to symmetric relation BA. Only 
olfactory stimuli were used because this modality is 
naturally involved when rats search for food. During every 
trial, after digging for a cup containing cereal buried in 
sand treated with the sample odor, two other comparison 
cups treated with new odors were presented. The odor of 
the first comparison for which rats began to dig considered 
the chosen comparison stimulus. In the extinction tests, 
injured rats neither learned symmetry CB nor transitivity 
AC, although control rats had accurate performance in 
tests of these emergent relations. These data, however, 
were not replicated in pigeons with hippocampal injury, 
which displayed normal pecking of visual stimuli in 
transitivity (Strasser, Ehrlinger, & Bingman, 2004).
Other ways to alter hippocampal function were 
also studied by H. Eichenbaum and highlight the 
importance of the entorhinal cortex (which has bulky 
interconnections with the hippocampus) in procedures 
of conditional discrimination. Results similar to those 
described by Bunsey and Eichenbaum (1996) were 
obtained by destroying the cholinergic afferents to 
the entorhinal cortex and consequently suppressing 
information transmitted from the entorhinal cortex to 
hippocampus. McGaughy, Koene, Eichenbaum, and 
Hasselmo (2005) studied conditional discrimination 
with odorized stimuli and verified that already learned 
conditional discrimination was maintained after lesions 
of cholinergic afferents in experimental subjects, even 
in intervals from 15 min to 3 h after training. However, 
no learning occurred when new odors were presented 
in non-reinforced tests performed after surgical lesion, 
reiterating the importance of hippocampal pathways 
for recent memories.
Additional consistent results by Bunsey and 
Eichenbaum (1996) and McGaughy et al. (2005) were 
found with lesions of the entorhinal cortex itself. 
Buckmaster, Eichenbaum, Amaral, Suzuki, and Rapp 
(2004) trained monkeys in conditional discriminations 
AB and AC, in which sample and comparison stimuli 
were cookies of different colors and shapes. The cookies 
used as sample and correct comparisons had the same 
appetitive flavor, whereas incorrect choices had a bitter 
flavor. Thus, the visual modality of cookies defined the 
antecedent stimuli (sample and comparison), whereas 
the gustative modality served as the positive or negative 
reinforcer for choices made both during training and 
testing because flavor was inherent to stimuli that the 
monkeys received and ingested. The authors verified 
that monkeys with an injured entorhinal cortex required 
longer for training and also did not show learning of 
transitive relations.
Confirming the importance of the entorhinal cortex 
in conditional discrimination, Coutureau et al. (2002) 
observed that lesions of the entorhinal cortex in rats, but 
not the hippocampus, hindered the reinforcing stimulus 
from joining as a member of equivalent classes of stimuli. 
After training with stimuli of the visual modality (i.e., 
chambers with different pictures on the walls), thermal 
modality (i.e., chambers with different temperatures), 
and auditory modality (i.e., sound or click), two classes 
were formed, each having a stimulus from the different 
modalities. Therefore, one class contained stimulus 
chamber with visual 1 (V1), stimulus chamber with 
temperature 1 (T1), and stimulus auditory 1 (A1), 
and the other class was formed by V2T2A2. Auditory 
stimuli were nodal stimuli from their respective classes. 
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A substantial amount of free food was then provided in 
chamber V1, but not in chamber V2, and greater activity 
was observed in the chamber associated with plenty of 
food. When rats with an injured hippocampus were placed 
in chambers T1 and T2, they behaved as if they were in 
V1 and V2, respectively. However, rats with entorhinal 
injury were not sensitive to differential reinforcement 
and, therefore, did not respond in chamber T as if they 
were in chamber V (i.e., injury of the entorhinal cortex 
damaged the formation of equivalence classes).
Regarding cellular measures, if learning of conditional 
discrimination corresponded to differential neuronal 
responses, specific neural pathways or processes can 
be suggested to codify meanings. Sakai and Miyashita 
(1991) recorded responses from temporal cortex neurons 
of two monkeys in a matching-to-sample procedure, 
presenting arbitrary visual stimuli (geometric patterns) on 
a computer screen. Because of the fact that the temporal 
cortex is intimately involved in memory processes, a 4 s 
delay was established between the end of the presentation 
of the sample and the presentation of comparison stimuli. 
The correct comparison choice would release fruit juice 
as the SR. Relations among 12 pairs of stimuli were 
reinforced (pairs 1–1’ to 12–12’), as well as respective 
symmetric relations (pairs 1’–1 to 12’–12). Two patterns 
of neuronal electrical activity appeared in records after 
training. In the first pattern, some neurons responded 
consistently to both members of certain stimuli pairs. 
For example, neuron X responded to pairs 12–12’ and 
12’–12, and neuron Y responded to pairs 5–5’ and 5’–5 
and also to 6–6’ and 6’–6. In the second pattern, other 
neurons responded better to one of the members of the 
pair. If, for example, the activity of neuron Z was greater 
for stimulus 7’, then both response elicitation as soon as 
this stimulus was presented in pair 7’–7 and a gradual 
increase in the neuronal response during the delay of pair 
7–7’ were verified. Such activity in this delay between 
the presentation of the sample and comparison stimuli 
was not attributable to anticipation of motor activity 
because monkeys could not foresee the position where 
the comparison stimulus would appear on the screen. 
Discriminative responses occurred for various pairs of 
stimuli because individual neurons codified each element 
of a pair independently from the function it assumed in 
the contingency, either as a sample or correct comparison 
because neurons codified previously and correctly the 
presence of a particular member of the pair of stimuli. 
By mentioning these results and indicating that behavior 
analysis cannot renounce neural analysis, depending on 
the research problem, Donahoe (1996) suggested that 
“direct effects of stimulus–stimulus relations can be 
observed only at the neural level” (p. 72).
Future research might well record the activity of 
dopaminergic mesencephalic neurons of monkeys during 
matching-to-sample. Generally, the best accuracy in 
behavioral performance during training implies the best 
prevision of which comparison signals reinforcement. 
Therefore, behavioral discrepancy would be less, and 
the response of dopaminergic neurons should decrease. 
Additionally, verifying the activity of these neurons in a 
test of emergent relations would be even more interesting. 
Would neural activity denote that new relations between 
stimuli cause surprise and a huge discrepancy? Or, 
conversely, could emergent relations show the same 
neural pattern observed for trained relations, revealing 
the absence of discrepancy?
A traditional question in the equivalence area concerns 
“whether emergent behavior exists before we actually see it” 
(Sidman, 1994, p. 274). Does it already exist after training 
but before the test of the emergence of new relations, or 
does it emerge only because of the variables present in 
the test? For some behavioral theorists (among them, M. 
Sidman himself), the assumption that classes of stimuli 
existed before the test contingency could dangerously 
fall into cognitivism. With regard to this issue, Haimson, 
Wilkinson, Rosenquist, Ouimet, and McIlvane (2009) 
reported an interesting datum that strengthens Sidman’s 
view of the need for testing. Similar to the normal case with 
humans, after the arbitrary matching-to-sample training, 
the participants of that study successfully performed the 
matching-to-sample test for emergent relations. But before 
or after the test phase, related and unrelated stimulus 
pairs were alternately presented in non-reinforced trials. 
These stimulus pairs involved the potentially related and 
unrelated stimuli that would appear in the equivalence 
test. The participants were asked to silently judge if each 
pair was related. Haimson and colleagues measured 
a brain wave pattern called N400, which is a normal 
voltage drop that typically appears approximately 400 
ms after noticing that phrases or words are semantically 
mismatched. The N400 pattern was immediately seen 
for unrelated pairs after the matching-to-sample testing 
phase. However, when the electrophysiological datum 
was collected prior to the matching-to-sample test, N400 
tended to develop over the trials with unrelated pairs. Once 
the N400 pattern was clearly established, the participants 
immediately showed accuracy in the ensuing matching-
to-sample test. This datum indicated that responding 
(silently judging) to stimulus pairs favored equivalence 
class formation. Thus, Haimson et al. (2009) indicated that 
non-reinforced presentation of related and unrelated pairs 
might have the same effect of non-reinforced matching-
to-sample testing. So the existence of a context of testing, 
regardless of whether it involves the matching-to-sample, 
is probably necessary for the emergence of equivalence 
relations, as Sidman (1994) argued. In practice, the N400 
waveform might be a good neural candidate to predict 
accuracy in symbolic learning.
The area of equivalence class formation opens 
multiple possibilities of research on the behavioral–
neural interface. This is especially true when considering, 
as suggested by Matos (1999) and Sidman (2000), 
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that antecedent stimuli, reinforcing stimuli, covert 
events such as drug effects, elicited responses such as 
skin conductance, and operant responses determined 
by reinforcement schedules may all become part of a 
stimulus class. Such inclusion suggests that all of these 
elements may be part of environment–behavior units 
selected by reinforcement, according to the proposal by 
Donahoe and Palmer (1994). A potentially fertile field is 
revealed here for the investigation of the neurobiological 
and behavioral variables confluence.
Final Considerations
The neural processes involved in stimulus control 
described in most articles selected for this paper 
parallel the conditioning paradigms. Such integration 
between the two paradigms demands careful analysis 
of the literature because almost all of the papers found 
were studies using either the classical or operant 
paradigm; they did not have to address, for example, the 
comparable features of experimental design. Few of the 
cited authors dealt with both paradigms, particularly J. 
H. Byrne. Apparently, even W. Schultz, one of the most 
quoted researchers in the present work, did not show 
concern in comparing paradigms. His analyses are 
simply descriptions of relations in terms of predictor 
stimuli (CS or SD) and predictable stimuli (US or SR), 
without mention of any possible interference between 
classical and operant contingencies. For example, in 
classical procedures, Schultz neither suggested nor 
controlled the possibility that superstitious operant 
responses (temporally contiguous but not causally 
contingent on consequence) interfered in the intervals 
between presentation of the CS and US (Fiorillo et 
al., 2003). Schultz also did not consider that although 
the antecedent stimulus normally serves as an SD 
in operant procedures it is impossible to assuredly 
know, at the neural level, whether the pathway of the 
antecedent stimulus would not actually elicit processes 
that culminate in the measured neural activity (Hassani 
et al., 2001; Schultz, 2000, 2004; Schultz et al., 2003; 
Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). The SD for an operant task, 
in fact, could also be a CS for neuronal activity.
A well-timed summary of the discussed findings 
will now be presented to clarify the similarities and 
differences between the mechanisms of both conditioning 
paradigms. The present paper also discussed the 
similarities with regard to the following points:
● Enhanced dopaminergic activity facilitates classical 
and operant conditioning (Wise, 2004; Taylor & Robbins, 
1984), and decreased dopaminergic activity attenuates both 
forms of learning (Wise, 2004; Wolterink et al., 1993). 
● Dopamine has an uncontested role as a signal 
of behavioral discrepancy in neural pathways of positive 
reinforcement in mammals. When the presentation of 
the US or SR+ is signaled, responses from dopaminergic 
neurons decrease for these stimuli and are transferred to 
the CS or SD (Fiorillo et al., 2003). The CS also evokes 
neuronal discriminative responses that vary according 
to US probability (i.e., to the degree of discrepancy) 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).
● Neuronal responses evoked by the SD inform 
whether there will be an emission of a motor response 
(Nicola et al., 2004) and also indicate the discrimination 
of preferred reinforcers (Hassani et al., 2001; Schultz, 
2000, 2004; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999).
● Prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices are 
important structures involved in stimulus control. Their 
neurons respond accordingly to stimuli that precede 
reinforcers preferred by monkeys (Hassani et al., 2001; 
Schultz, 2000, 2004; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). 
Lesions of these cortices hinder successful reversal of 
stimulus control in rats, monkeys, and humans (Butter, 
1969; Chudasama & Robbins, 2003; Jones & Mishkin, 
1972; Rolls, 2000) and also block both classical and 
operant extinction (Butter, 1969; Gottfried & Dollan, 
2004; Rolls, 2000).
● Glutamate modulates dopaminergic activity in 
both conditioning paradigms and is released by the CS 
and SD antecedent stimulus pathway (Wise, 2004).
● Until the present time, only the nervous 
system of the Aplysia allowed the observation, in 
the same experimental design, of both classical and 
operant conditioning. Both forms of learning use the 
same neural pathways for reinforcement and the same 
neurotransmitter (dopamine) and also produce plasticity 
in the same buccal motor neuron, B51 (Baxter & Byrne, 
2006; Lorenzetti et al., 2006).
The data reviewed so far, with respect to stimulus 
control, suggest that the boundaries between reflexive and 
operant behavior are feeble. Nevertheless, an important 
difference was found by Lorenzetti et al. (2006). The 
plasticity shown by neuron B51 of Aplysia took distinct 
courses in operant and classical conditioning. In the former, 
neuronal excitability increased, whereas it diminished 
in the latter. The case of classical conditioning appears 
apparently incongruent because diminished excitability 
tends to produce minor CR elicitation. However, a 
concomitant increase was found in the excitatory input of 
the presynaptic neuron that compensated for the diminished 
excitability of B51 in classical conditioning. Differences 
were found in the intrinsic properties of neuron B51, which 
justifies, according to Lorenzetti and colleagues, new 
detailed investigations about the reinforcement pathway 
(US or SR+) and CS pathway of Aplysia.
The study of neural variables may in fact be 
potentially applied to the entire research program of 
behavior analysis. For example, stimulus equivalence 
is an obvious field ripe for exploration. In addition 
to the promising use of waveforms such as N400 in 
anticipating accuracy in complex learning (Haimson 
et al., 2009), researchers can explore the common 
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pathways that are reasonably used by all stimuli that 
share behavioral functions. If these pathways are found, 
then studying how neural convergence is created for 
different stimuli assembled in a class is possible. Some 
important methodologies were not included in this 
paper because they would add an untenable volume 
of text. Among them are studies on biofeedback and 
neuroimaging techniques.
Finally, we hope the presented analysis has caused 
some positive behavioral discrepancy in the reader. If 
so, then some theoretical progress in the understanding 
of the biology of reinforcement has been achieved.
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